报告题目：The Innovation Arms Race

报 告 人：Jarrad Harford（华盛顿大学）

报告时间：2022年3月29日（周二）9:00-10:30

报告地点：ZOOM平台在线交流（会议ID：945 9949 9908 ；会议密码：344093）

ZOOM App下载链接：//zoom.us/download, 亦可点击以下链接直接参加会议：//hawaii.zoom.us/j/94599499908

主办单位：应用金融与行为科学学院

【报告人简介】

Jarrad Harford is the Paul Pigott - PACCAR Professor of Finance and Chair of the Finance and Business Economics Department at the University of Washington’s Foster School of Business. He earned his PhD in Finance with a minor in Organizations and Markets at the University of Rochester. His teaching focuses on core finance and acquisition analysis.

Professor Harford currently serves as a Managing Editor of the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis and just completed a 20-year term as an Associate Editor for the Journal of Financial Economics. In the past, he has served as an Associate Editor for the Review of Financial Studies and the Journal of Corporate Finance. His primary research areas are mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance and payout policy, and he has published more than 30 papers on these topics in top finance journals.  In 2020, Pearson-Prentice Hall published the fifth edition of a Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, co-authored by Prof. Harford.

【内容摘要】

Economists have long recognized that competition and innovation interact as key drivers of economic growth (Schumpeter, 1943; Arrow, 1962; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Acknowledging this, regulators carefully scrutinize competitive behaviors that potentially affect innovation incentives, in particular in the case of proposed mergers (Shapiro, 2012). Do acquisitions of innovative targets spur or stifle innovation? To address this question, we provide a first large scale empirical investigation of M&A effects on acquirer rivals’ incentives to innovate and the equilibrium outcome resulting from this competitive process. Our results are consistent with an innovation arms race: acquisitions of innovative targets push acquirer rivals to invest more in innovation, both internally through research and development (R&D) and externally through acquisition of innovative targets, and this increase in innovation investment necessary to maintain competitive position leads to a decrease in firm market valuation. These results are robust to endogeneity and are driven by the High-Technology industry. This arms race process appears stronger for leaders and neck-and-neck firms. Initial patents and patent citations based evidence shows no sign of innovation investment efficiency decline, suggesting that the innovation arms race generates a transfer of economic rent favorable to consumers.

撰稿：赵鹏辉  审核：李凤羽  单位：应用金融与行为科学学院